 |
MacMahon was a general in the war of 1870-71 and President of the
French republic. There is, therefore, nothing peculiar if a general passes from
the military to the political field.
German history does not furnish many
incidents of this kind. Count Moltke who conducted the three wars preceding the
establishment of the German Reich kept himself entirely out of politics. Only
one of his successors, Count Waldersee, showed some political ambition, but his
tenure of office as Chief of the General Staff was short. Count Schlieffen was
a soldier and nothing but a soldier. The younger Moltke lacked political
talents. It was only during the last years of the war, 1914-18, that Ludendorff
exerted more and more influence on politics, and the consequence of his
activities was that the propaganda of the leftist parties in Germany magnified
the role of military influence in politics to such an extent that the good name
of the army was beclouded in public opinion for long. As a result of this
development, von Seeckt, who was responsible for the Reichswehr after 1919,
decided to keep the Reichswehr entirely out of politics. He succeeded so
completely that foreigners were frequently puzzled as to why military leaders
in high positions after von Seeckt’s time were so entirely inept
politically and were unable to build up a front against Hitler. Here a lesson
of history was heeded and actually translated into reality.
By the end of the 'twenties the Reichswehr
had developed into that what an army should be, nothing but an instrument of
the legitimate political leaders of the nation. Von Seeckt left only two
political disciples among the generals of the higher commands: von Schleicher
and von Hammerstein. A recent study by the German Chancellor Bruening who was
the last prominent political figure before 1933, reveals that he, who is
universally regarded as the last democratic chancellor, contemplated with these
two generals the destruction of the growing National Socialist Party at the end
of the ’twenties by using the army to crush it. He was only prevented from
doing so by the resistance of von Hindenburg, who argued that the armed forces
should not be used against any one party. If it was to be used, he decided,
that should be done against the National Socialists and the Communists
simultaneously. Bruening did not advise his cabinet about his plans, nor did
von Schleicher and von Hammerstein advise any other generals about them;
certainly, none of those who are now defendants in this case. I am emphasizing
this in order to illustrate how feeble a plant the democratic idea was in the
Weimar Republic. It must be almost unbelievable for men who have always lived
under a democratic or parliamentary system of government that such a state of
affairs could prevail in a republic; that instead of carry-
[…ing] |
| |
219 |
. 
