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| II. ARRAIGNMENT |
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| Extracts of official transcript of Military Tribunal V A, case No.
12, in the matter of the United States of America vs. Wilhelm von Leeb et al.,
defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 30 December 1947, Judge John C.
Young presiding. |
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PRESIDING JUDGEYOUNG : Military Tribunal V A will come to order. The
Tribunal will now proceed with the arraignment of the defendants in Case No. 12
pending before this Tribunal.
The Secretary General will call the roll
of the defendants.
DR. LATERNSER (counsel for the defendant von Leeb):
If Your Honors please, I am Dr. Laternser, and I am defense counsel for the
defendant von Leeb. I have also been chosen spokesman for the defense. Before
this Tribunal proceeds with the arraignment of the defendants, I would like to
put a motion for the whole of the defense.
I move that this Tribunal
pronounce itself incompetent to try these defendants, and I would like to give
my reasons for this motion. All generals who are defendants here were during
the last war officers of the German Armed Forces. They were combatants in the
meaning of Article I of the Annex to the Hague Convention for Land Warfare, and
as such, they were captured by the enemy. According to the Geneva Convention
they are consequently entitled to be recognized as prisoners of war. Already
during peacetime it was recognized that a soldier is under a special law;
soldiers have to be his judges. It is so everywhere, because even in peace the
life of a soldier is governed by different conditions compared with the life of
an ordinary citizen. Much more so does this apply in war. It is therefore all
the more important that actions committed in war by a soldier should be judged
by a court consisting of soldiers. The United States acts in accordance with
this rule concerning their own soldiers. The rights of the soldier prisoner of
war are governed by the Rules of the Geneva Convention. In accordance with
Article 63, sentence on a prisoner of war can only be pronounced by the same
courts and according to the same procedure as applied to a member of the state
holding the prisoner. It is however, not undisputed whether or not the state
holding the prisoner is at all competent to try acts which were committed by
the prisoner before he was captured. If one answers this question in the
affirmative, irrespective for what reasons, then Article 63 of the Geneva
Convention applies to this extent. The range of acts committed during captivity
is not a very extensive one. They are |
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